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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants (hereafter Employer) appealed a Decision and Order issued by the Idaho 
Industrial Commission in a workers' compensation case. The sole issue before the Commission 
was: "Whether permanent paiiial disability survives the death of Claimant for reasons unrelated 
to the industrial injury." A hearing was not held before the Industrial Commission, as the paiiies 
stipulated to the relevant facts. Following the parties' submission of post-hearing briefs, Referee 
Brian Harper issued his proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Recommendation on 
April 1, 2015. Referee Harper concluded that permanent paiiial disability survives death under 
I.C. § 72-431 when the death is unrelated to the industrial injury. The Industrial Commission did 
not adopt Referee Harper's opinion. On July 21, 2015, consistent with Referee Harper's proposed 
decision, a majority of the Industrial Commission concluded that pe1manent partial disability less 
than total survives the death of the injured worker. Commissioner Thomas E. Limbaugh 
dissented. 
As paii of the Industrial Commission proceedings, the parties stipulated to the following 
facts: 
1. On February 10, 2012 Claimant Keith Mayer (hereafter Claimant) was an employee 
of TPC Holdings Inc. (hereafter Employer) in Lewiston, Id. At said time, TPC 
Holdings Inc. was insured for its obligations under the Idaho Worker's Compensation 
Act by Libe1iy N01ihwest Insurance Corp. (hereafter Surety). 
2. On or about February 10, 2012 Claimant, Employer, and Surety were subject to 
provisions of Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law. 
3. Claimant suffered a compensable worker's compensation injury when he strained his 
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back while lifting a computer monitor. Earlier the same day, he grabbed a ladder to 
prevent it from falling through a window and felt a twisting in his back. Both events 
occmTed in the course and scope of Claimant's employment with Employer on 
February 10, 2012. Employer is the Lewiston Tribune where Claimant worked as a 
maintenance worker. 
4. Surety paid medical and time loss benefits to Claimant as a result of the injury to his 
back. 
5. On August 27, 2012 Dr. Dietrich performed a lumbar decompression and 
decompression of the central canal lateral recess at neural foramina at L3, 14, 15, and 
SI. 
6. On November 8, 2012 Employer discharged Claimant. 
7. Dr. Dietrich deemed Claimant MMI as of September 1, 2013. 
8. On October 28, 2013 Dr. Goler performed an IME at surety's request. Dr. Goler 
believed Claimant was medically stable and could return to full time work at least at 
the light or sedentary level with frequent positional changes and no lifting over 50 
pounds. Dr. Goler gave Claimant a 9% WPI. 
9. On December 18, 2013 Dr. McNulty performed an IME at Claimant's request. He 
diagnosed Claimant with: chronic low back pain status post multi-level lumbar 
decompression; residual left S 1 radiculopathy; and spinal instability at 15-S 1. Dr. 
McNulty recommended further diagnostic testing. Dr. McNulty assigned a 14% WPI 
attributable to the industrial injury. Dr. McNulty opined that Claimant was only 
capable of performing sedentary work on a part-time basis with no repetitive lifting 
and stooping and frequent positional changes. Dr. McNulty did not believe Claimant 
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could return to his time of injury job. 
10. Dr. Dietrich concurred by letter with Dr. McNulty's IME. 
11. On March 15, 2014 Claimant died of a heaii attack, umelated to the industrial injury. 
Claimant was born o  He was 65 years old at the time of his death. 
12. Surety averaged the impairment awards given by Dr. McNulty and Dr. Goler. Surety 
continued paying PPI after Claimant's death until the award of $19,086.37 was paid in 
full. This award is equal to 52.5 weeks of benefits at $363.55 per week. 
II. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether pe1manent pmiial disability survives the death of Claimant for reasons umelated 
to the industrial injury. 
III. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL - ATTORNEY FEES 
As set forth below, Employer has appealed an Industrial Commission decision that is 
consistent with Idaho law and precedent. Despite a plain and unambiguous statute, a history of 
Industrial Commission decisions, the Referee's decision in the cmTent case, and the 
Commission's decision in the cmTent case, Employer appealed the Industrial Commission's 
decision without a reasonable ground. Pursuant to LC. § 72-804, Claimant is entitled to attorney 
fees and costs on appeal. 
An award of attorney fees is also appropriate under I.A.R. 11.2. The Supreme Comi will 
award attorney fees pursuant to I.A.R. 11.2 if a requesting pmiy proves that "the other party's 
arguments are not well grounded in fact, [or] wananted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law ... " Sims v. Jacobson, 342 P.3d 907 
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(2015). As set forth below, Employer's arguments are neither well-grounded in fact nor 
wananted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law. 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court's task on appeal is to ascertain whether the Industrial Commission 
properly applied the law to the facts of a case. Idaho Const. art. V, Section 9; Morgan v. 
Columbia Helicopters, Inc., 118 Idaho 347, 350, 796 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1990). The Supreme 
Court of the State of Idaho views all facts and inferences "in the light mast favorable to the party 
who prevailed before the Commission." Taylor v. Soran Rest., Inc., 131 Idaho 525, 527, 960 
P.2d 1256 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
"The provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally constrned in favor 
of the employee. Liberal construction in favor of the worker is required to enable the act to serve 
the humane purposes for which it was promulgated, 'leaving no room for nanow, technical 
construction."' Sprague v. Caldwell Transp., Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 721, 779 P.2d 395, 396 (1989) 
(emphasis in original; citations omitted) (quoting Hattenburg v. Blanks, 98 Idaho 485, 578 P.2d 
829 (1977)). 
Idaho Code § 72-431 mandates the inheritability of pe1manent disability benefits less 
than total. 
A. Idaho Code § 72-431 is plain and unambiguous. 
Idaho Code § 72-431 reads: 
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INHERITABILITY OF SCHEDULED OR UNSCHEDULED INCOME 
BENEFITS. When an employee who has sustained disability compensable as a scheduled 
or unscheduled peimanent disability less than total, and who has filed a valid claim in his 
lifetime, dies from causes other than the injury or occupational disease before the 
expiration of the compensable period specified, the income benefits specified and unpaid 
at the employee's death, whether or not accrued or due at the time of his death, shall be 
paid, under an award made before or after such death, to and for the benefit of the 
persons within the classes at the time of death and in the prop01iions and upon the 
conditions specified in this subsection and in the order named: 
(1) To the dependent widow or widower, if there is no child under the age of eighteen 
(18) or child incapable of self-supp01i. .. 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the Supreme Comi of the State of 
Idaho exercises free review. State v. Hali, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850 (2001). Interpretation 
of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 
654,659,978 P.2d 214 (1999). 
Employer writes: "the term 'disability' is used broadly throughout the Code in sections 
where it clearly is not intended to encompass any disability in excess of impaiiment." App. Br. 
pp. 11-12. In fact, "disability" and "permanent disability", as used in I.C. § 72-431, are terms of 
art that are defined in the Idaho Code 
"Disability," for purposes of dete1mining total or paiiial temporary disability income 
benefits, means a decrease in wage-earning capacity due to the injury or occupational 
disease, as such capacity is affected by the medical factor of physical impairment, and by 
pertinent nonmedical factors as provided in section 72-430, Idaho Code. 
r.c. § 72-102(11). 
PERMANENT DISABILITY. "Pe1manent disability" or "under a pe1manent disability" 
results when the actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or 
absent because of pe1manent paiiial impairment and no fundamental or marked change in 
the future cane be reasonably expected. 
I.C. § 72-423. According to I.C. § 73-113(3), words and phrases that "are defined in the 
succeeding section, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or 
definition." The Supreme Court of the United States wrote: "We have stated time and again that 
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comis must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what 
it says there ... When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then this first canon is also the last: 
Judicial inquiry is complete."' Connecticut National Bank v. Ge1main, 503 U.S. 249, 112 S.Ct. 
1146 (1992) (citations omitted). 
Idaho Code § 72-431 is plain on its face. It allows for the inheritability of permanent 
disability benefits when ce1iain criteria are met. 
First the pe1manent disability must be less than total. The issue presently before the 
Comi, as stipulated by the pmiies, is specifically about pe1manent pmiial disability. 
Second, the statute requires that a valid claim be filed during the claimant's lifetime. As 
set forth in the Stipulation of Facts, Claimant filed a valid claim in his lifetime. R. p. 6. 
Third, the claimant must die from causes other than the work injury. Claimant died of a 
heart attack unrelated to the work injury. R. p. 8. 
Fourth, Claimant must die before the expiration of the compensable period specified. 
Employer was paying permanent pmiial impailment benefits at the time of Claimant's death. R. 
p. 8. Thus, Claimant was within his compensable period at the time of his death. What is more, 
even if impairment were not being paid at the time of Claimant's death, the statute allows for a 
determination of the compensable period after death. 
All of the requirements of I.C. § 72-431 for inheritability of disability benefits are 
satisfied in the present case. As will be set forth below, both this Court and the Commission have 
applied I.C. § 72-431 in multiple cases without any discussion of ambiguity. Based on a plain 
reading of the statute, it is clear that pe1manent disability benefits less than total are inheritable 
per I.C. § 72-431. 
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B. Idaho Code§ 72-431 has been applied by this Court and the Industrial 
Commission. 
Employer contends that LC. § 72-431 is ambiguous. Employer's position is inconsistent 
with the plain language of the statute and with the cases that have been before the Supreme Cami 
of the State ofldaho and the Industrial Commission prior to the present case. 
Neither the Commission nor the Employer in this case addressed the only Idaho Supreme 
Cami case that discusses LC.§ 72-431. In Palomo v. J.R. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 314,955 P.2d 
1093 (1998), the central issue before the Cami was the application of LC.§ 72-431. The 
claimant in Palomo had stipulated with the surety and the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund that 
she was totally and permanently disabled. The surety agreed to pay 50% of Paloma's total 
pe1manent disability benefits under the Carey Formula. The Commission found that the pmiion 
of permanent disability benefits payable by the surety were inheritable. Ove1iurning the 
Commission decision, the Cami held: "Section 72-431, governing the inheritability of income 
benefits, applies only if an employee has sustained a disability less than total. .. Thus, we find that 
the Industrial Commission effed in finding that Simplot is paying paiiial permanent disability 
benefits for the purpose of LC. Section 72-431." This Cami found that LC.§ 72-431 governs 
when "an employee has sustained a disability less than total." Notably, this Cami did not find 
that permanent paiiial disability was not entirely uninheritable. Also absent from the Cami's 
opinion was any discussion of ambiguity. 
In 1988 the Commission decided the case ofMaiiin v. Nampa Hwy. Dist., 1988 IIC 0367 
(1988). In Maiiin, the claimant had suffered a compensable work-related injury but died before 
an agreement could be reached or an order issued deciding the amount of her permanent 
impaiiment and her permanent disability. The sole issue before the Commission was: "whether 
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the claimant's present request for an award of permanent partial disability has survived her death 
. . 
from umelated causes." Similar to the present case, Martin's employer argued that since the 
permanent partial disability claim had not been adjudicated at the time of claimant's death, the 
pe1manent disability claim was unspecified and not owed to the claimant. The Commission 
disagreed. Applying LC. § 72-431, the Commission held: 
The extent of a claimant's permanent partial disability is never finally determined until 
there is an award of the Commission following an evidentiary hearing or unless the 
paiiies have reached an agreement with regard to such permanent partial disability, 
reduced the agreement to writing and had the agreement aproved by the Commission. 
Such approved agreement also constitutes an award of the Commission. We note that 
Sec. 72-431 specifically empowers the Commission to make an award both before and 
after the death of the claimant. We therefore conclude that 72-431 does not require that 
the extent of a claimant's permanent paiiial disability be specified by an award prior to 
the death of the claimant in order for the income benefits to survive the death of the 
claimant and be distributed to survivors. 
The decision in Martin is only two pages long. Notably absent from the Commission's discussion 
of LC. § 72-431 is any mention of ambiguity. The Commission in Maiiin found LC. § 72-431 
readily applicable to virtually the same issue that is presently before the Comi. 
More recently, the Commission in Havens v. ISIF, 2009 IIC 0745 (2009), reaffamed the 
purpose of LC. § 72-431: "Under Idaho Code§ 72-431, disability benefits for less than total and 
pe1manent disability are inheritable." 
Finally, in the case presently before the Court, the Commission held: "Permanent paiiial 
disability less than total survives the death of the injured worker." R. p. 37. 
Although applied infrequently, both this Court and the Industrial Commission have 
previously held that permanent disability benefits less than total are inheritable under LC. § 72-
431. 
C. Statutory construction is both unnecessary and improper. 
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Although neither the Court nor the Commission has found I.C. § 72-431 ambiguous, a 
significant p01iion of Employer's brief is dedicated to statutory construction. The Idaho Code 
addresses statutory construction: 
CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS AND PHRASES. (1) The language ofa statute should 
be given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, 
the expressed intent of the legislature shall be given effect without engaging in statutory 
construction. The literal words of a statute are the best guide to determining legislative 
intent. 
(2) If a statute is capable of more than one (1) conflicting construction, the 
reasonableness of the proposed interpretation shall be considered, and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. Interpretations which would render the statute a nullity, or which 
would lead to absurd results, are disfavored ... 
I.C. § 73-113. Statutory construction is only appropriate when a statute is ambiguous: "If the 
statutory language is unambiguous, 'the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be 
given effect, and there is no occasion for a comi to consider rules of statutory construction.' The 
plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is 
contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results" St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. 
of Com'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683 (2009) (internal citations omitted). 
A statute is ambiguous when: 
[T]he meaning is so doubtful or obscure that reasonable minds might be uncertain or 
disagree as to its meaning. However, ambiguity is not established merely because 
different possible interpretations are presented to the court. If this were the case then all 
statutes that are the subject oflitigation could be considered ambiguous ... [A] statute is 
not ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of 
it. 
BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 358, 63 P.3d 482 (2003). 
Prior to the present case, both this Court and the Industrial Commission have applied I.C. 
§ 72-431 in a way that is consistent with inheritability of pe1manent paiiial disability benefits. As 
set fo1ih in the cases above, the meaning ofI.C. § 72-431 is clear. Idaho Code§ 72-431 is plain 
and unambiguous. Employer has not documented any "clearly expressed legislative intent" that 
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is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. Therefore, LC. § 72-431 is not subject to statutory 
interpretation. Nonetheless, some of Employer's statutory construction arguments will be 
addressed below. 
case: 
1. Idaho Code§ 72-431 is not a codification of the common law. 
Employer argues extensively about the common law and its application to the present 
It is not to be presumed that legislature intended to abrogate or modify a rule of common 
law by enactment of statute upon the same subject; it is rather to be presumed that no 
change in common law was intended, unless such language employed clearly indicates 
such intention. 
App. Br. p. 29. In fact, Title 72 explicitly abrogates the common law. 
Idaho Code§ 72-201 reads as follows: 
DECLARATION OF POLICE POWER. The common law system governing the 
remedy of workmen against employers for injuries received and occupational 
diseases contracted in industrial and public work is inconsistent with modern 
industrial conditions. The welfare of the state depends upon its industries and even more 
upon the welfare of its wageworkers. The state of Idaho, therefore, exercising herein 
its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the premises are 
withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for injured workmen 
and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and 
to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as is 
otherwise provided in this act, and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action 
for such personal in.iuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such 
causes are hereby abolished, except as is in this law provided. ( emphasis added). 
Idaho Code§ 72-201 states in no uncertain tenns that Idaho workers' compensation disputes are 
removed from the common law "except as provided" in Title 72. Thus, the common law is 
inapplicable to present case. 
2. Employer provides no evidence of legislative intent. 
Employer invokes legislative intent no fewer than nine times in its brief to supp01i its 
position that disability benefits are not inheritable. For legislative intent to prevail over the plain 
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language of a statute, it must be clearly expressed. Noticeably lacking from Employer's brief is 
any reference to a source that actually documents the legislative intent. There is no citation of 
legislative minutes, meetings, or drafts. As noted in the Commission's Decision, "A history of 
discussions, debates, conferences, and legislative action leading to the comprehensive 
recodification of the workers' compensation laws is sadly incomplete." R. p. 31. Much of 
Employer's argument with respect to legislative intent is based on assumptions regarding 
common law. As set forth above, the Idaho legislature abrogated the common law in Title 72. 
Employer also appeals to legislative intent with respect to the "Model Act". Employer 
argues that the Model Act proves that there was no legislative intent to make disability benefits 
inheritable. Employer's position is inconsistent with history and with the Idaho Code. 
The only thing we know about the legislature's approach to LC. § 72-431 with respect to 
the Model Act is that the legislature chose to change the Model Code's language. As set forth in 
the Industrial Commission's Decision, "Idaho Code§ 72-431 does not address 'subsection (c)" of 
the Model Code. Rather, it references 'scheduled and unscheduled pemrnnent disability less than 
total"'. The Commission goes on to properly conclude that the Model Code is not helpful in 
understanding LC. § 72-431. R. p. 33. 
The only intent that can be discerned from the legislature with respect to the Model Act is 
that the legislature intended to depart from it, as evidenced by the LC. § 72-431 's departure from 
the model language. 
3. Idaho Code § 72-431 does not require that income benefits are 
specified and unpaid when the employee dies. 
Employer argues at length that benefits must be specified and unpaid in order for the 
benefits to be inheritable. Def. Br. p. 12, 22-26. In making this argument, Employer disregards 
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the plain language of I.C. § 72-431, which reads: 11 ••• the income benefits specified and unpaid at 
the employee's death, whether or not accrued or due at the time of his death, shall be paid, 
under an award made before or after such death ... " (emphasis added). As set forth by the 
Commission in Maliin: 
We note that Sec. 72-431 specifically empowers the Commission to make an award both 
before and after the death of the claimant. We therefore conclude that 72-431 does not 
require that the extent of a claimant's permanent partial disability be specified by an 
award prior to the death of the claimant in order for the income benefits to survive the 
death of the claimant and be distributed to survivors. 
The plain language of I.C. § 72-431 clearly establishes that permanent disability benefits less 
than total are payable whether or not the benefits are accrued or due at the time of death and 
whether or not the benefit are awarded before or after death. 
4. Idaho Code § 72-431 does not require that damages be liquidated 
prior to death. 
In conjunction with its specified and unpaid argument, Employer argues that damages 
must be liquidated to be inheritable. App. Br. pp. 17-26. Employer's argument again revolves 
around the common law. As previously discussed, the Legislature explicitly rejected the common 
law with the adoption of Title 72. Although the rejection of the common law adequately 
addresses Employer's arguments, a few points regarding liquidated damages deserve attention. 
Employer writes: "The award may be made after the death of a claimant, but only so long 
as the right to compensation is fixed by statute." App. Br. p. 17. This statement is consistent with 
I.C. § 72-431 and Claimant's position. In fact, every benefit available under the workers' 
compensation laws is "fixed by statute." As such, all permanent disability benefits, except total 
permanent disability, are readily quantifiable based on the average state wage and the 500 week 
man. I.C. § 72-426. Total permanent disability is the only benefit that is not calculated based on 
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the 500 week man but is paid until the claimant's death. What is notew01ihy about Employer's 
argument is the fact that the permanent disability benefit in Idaho workers' compensation that 
cannot be calculated using a fixed f01mula is specifically excluded from I.C. § 72-431. 
Employer's argument that impairment benefits should be inheritable because they can be 
dete1mined with a fixed f01mula but disability benefits should not be inheritable because they 
cannot be calculated with a fixed f01mula is simply inconsistent with the Idaho Code, Supreme 
Comi decisions, and Industrial Commission decisions. App. Br. pp. 18-19. Both impailment and 
disability benefits are calculated based on a percentage of the 500 week whole man. The Court 
has held that when determining impairment, the opinions of physicians are advisory only. The 
Commission is the ultimate evaluator of impailment. U1Ty v. Walker Fox Masomy Contractors, 
115 Idaho 750, 755, 769 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1989). 
Just like disability, impairment only becomes a "liquidated" damage once the 
Commission has issued a decision and order. 
D. Idaho Workers' Compensation is not governed by other jurisdictions. 
Employer's argument that the Commission's application of I. C. § 72-431 is at odds with 
the rest of the country is ilTelevant. The rest of the country is not governed by LC. § 72-431, and 
Idaho is not governed by the rest of the country. 
The foregoing notwithstanding, Employer's argument is not only i1Televant, it is also 
misplaced. Employer cites Larson's Workers' Compensation§ 98.06 entitled "Death Benefits" to 
supp01i its argument that § 72-431 does not allow for inheritability of benefits. Employer, 
however, cites to a section of Larson's discussing death benefits. The issue presently before the 
Court does not pe1iain to death benefits but inheritability of permanent partial disability benefits 
less than total. Section 89 of Larson's Workers' Compensation entitled Heritability and 
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Assignability of Claims and Benefits appears to be more on point. According to§ 89.03 
Unaccrued Payments: 
When, however, the award, although for a fixed number of weeks, is paid weekly or 
periodically, most jurisdictions in the absence of a special statute to the contrary have 
held that the heirs have no claim upon the unaccrued payments, since the award is a 
personal one, based upon the employee's need for substitute for lost wages and eaming 
capacity ... ( emphasis added) 
Larson discusses the exact scenario as it exists in Idaho. Namely, a "special statute", I.C. § 72-
431, has been adopted by the Legislature to allow for the inheritability of pe1manent disability 
benefits less than total. 
E. Employer's arguments regarding Brown and Davaz are unpersuasive. 
Employer contends that it would be impermissible to award benefits posthumously, based 
on this Comi's decisions in Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 870 P.2d 1292 
(1994), and Brown v. Home Depot Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 605,272 P.3d 577 (2012). Employer's 
reading of Brown and Davaz is overbroad. 
In making its argument, Employer ignores the Comi's discussion in both cases stating 
that determining disability at the time of hearing is a "general rule" that has exceptions. The 
Brown decision cited the Davaz decision approvingly: 
Granted, there may be instances where a market other than the claimant's 
residence at the time of the hearing is relevant to the I.C. § 72-430(1) inquiry, and 
such detenninations should be made on a case by case basis based on individual 
facts and circumstances. See e.g. Lyons v. Industrial Special lndem. Fund, 98 
Idaho 403,565 P.2d 1360 (1977) (comi allowed evidence from market vacated by 
claimant after injury as well as market of residence at the time of the hearing). 
The Brown and Davaz decisions readily acknowledge that it will not be appropriate in all cases 
to dete1mine disability at the time of hearing. 
As the Commission aptly pointed out in this case: 
Were the Commission required to measure the injured worker's disability as of the date of 
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hearing, no disability would ever be awarded in view of the fact that claimant's death was 
unconnected to the work accident and constitutes a superseding intervening cause 
primarily responsible for the injured worker's inability work. This nonsensical result 
could not have been contemplated by those who drafted Idaho Code § 72-431. 
R. p. 36. 
Since I.C. § 72-431 specifically says that disability benefits can be awarded after death, 
awarding disability to the heirs of a deceased claimant is not precluded by the above decisions. 
Employer's arguments are inconsistent with the plain language of I.C. § 72-431 and with the 
principles set fmih in Brown and Davaz. 
F. Idaho Code§ 72-431 does not violate the equal protection clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Employer's allegation that the "Commission does not even attempt to provide a rational 
basis for the Equal Protection problem its interpretation creates" is unfounded. In reality, the 
Commission does not have jurisdiction to address constitutional challenges. Tupper v. State 
Fmm Ins., 131 Idaho 724, 729, 963 P.2d 1161 (1998). 
When a pmiy challenges the constitutionality of a statute, the Supreme Cami of the State 
of Idaho presumes the statute is constitutional unless that pmiy proves otherwise. Luttrell v. 
Clearwater County Sheriffs Office, 140 Idaho 581,585, 97 P.3d 448 (2004). When deciding 
whether a statute violates equal protection, the Cami must first, identify the classification which 
is being challenged, and second, dete1mine the standard under which the classification will be 
reviewed. Tm·box v. Tax Comm'n., 107 Idaho 957,695 P.2d 342 (1984). 
As the Workers' Compensation Law involves social and economic welfare issues, "equal 
protection challenges to those statutes are subject to the rational basis test." Venters v. Sorrento 
Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245,251, 108 P.3d 392 (2005). Thus, the Cami must determine 
whether LC. § 72-431 bem·s a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. See 
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Luttrell at 585. Under the rational basis test, a classification will withstand an equal protection 
challenge ifthere is any conceivable state of facts which will support it. Bint v. Creative Forest 
Prod., 108 Idaho 116,120,697 P.2d 818 (1985). 
In this case, Employer is arguing that LC. § 72-431 violates the equal protection clause 
because LC. § 72-431 treats permanent partial disability different than permanent total disability. 
"The Supreme Comi of the United States has consistently held that the Equal Protection 
Clause does not prohibit states from treating different classes of people differently." Credit 
Bureau ofE. Idaho, Inc. v. Lecheminant, 149 Idaho 467,470,235 P.3d 1188, 1191 (2010). In 
Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 316 P.3d 671, 155 Idaho 755 (2014), the Court cited the above 
language to supp01i its determination that claimants' attorneys and defense attorneys could be 
treated differently under the Workers' Compensation Laws, as the two classes of attorneys were 
treated differently by statute. In much the same manner, LC. § 72-431 makes a distinction 
between injured workers with total pe1manent disability and injured workers with permanent 
paiiial disability. Since injured workers with disability less than total are a different class, injured 
workers with disability less than total can be treated differently than totally disabled workers 
without violating the equal protection clause. 
This Comi's reasoning in Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258,954 P.2d 676 (1998) 
is also instructive. In Meisner this Comi was asked to decide whether LC.§ 72-413 violated the 
equal protection clause because it allowed for dependent children of deceased workers to receive 
benefits under the statute while leaving independent children without compensation. This Comi 
reasoned: 
Worker's compensation statutes must be considered in the context of the entire act. 
Arneson v. Robinson, 59 Idaho 223, 82 P.2d 249 (1938). The purpose of the worker's 
compensation act is not only to provide relief for workers but also to protect industry by 
providing a limit on liability. By limiting the class of people who can collect benefits, § 
16 
72-413 arguably protects Idaho industry by providing some degree of certainty in te1ms 
of liability. · 
By statute, "disability less than total" is limited to 499 weeks of benefits, while total disability is 
only limited by an iajured worker's lifetime. In the case presently before the Court, it is both 
rational and reasonable for the legislature to limit benefits to those individuals who are less than 
totally and permanently disabled. By limiting the class of people who can collect benefits, LC. § 
72-431 protects Idaho industry by providing a degree of ce1iainty with respect to disability 
payments. 
LC. § 72-431 bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. Totally and 
pe1manently disabled workers are in a different class than permanently partially disabled 
workers. Thus, LC.§ 72-431 does not violate the equal protection clause. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
Consistent with a liberal construction in favor of the injured worker, the plain meaning of 
Idaho Code § 72-431, the Industrial Commission's past application of§ 72-431, and the 
Commission's application of§ 72-431 in the present case, Claimant respectfully requests that the 
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affam the Industrial Commission's decision and award 
attorney fees and costs to Claimant. 
Dated this 16th day of November 2015. 
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